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Abstract 
Entry of new firms can be difficult or even impossible at capacity constrained facilities, despite the 
actual cost of entering is low. Using a game theoretic model of incumbent firms’ pricing behaviour 
under these conditions, it is found that under the assumption of Bertrand competition and firms 
having different costs, the optimal pricing behaviour imply price stickiness and upward pricing. The 
findings further suggest a competitive behaviour of incumbents of disposing weaker opponents only 
if, it leads to weaker competitors entering the market and to use weaker opponents to shelter the 
incumbent. The results propose a new explanation of the mixed empirical findings on incumbent 
pricing to entry and suggest that competition authorities should use an effect-based approach to 
detect the behaviour. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In most models of industrial organisation entry of firms is assumed to be easy, costless and no 
physical limit is placed on the number of firms that a market can accommodate. If there is a “limit” 
it is due to the level of market demand or due to initial assumptions about market structure. In some 
markets it is not first and foremost market demand that determines the number of firms the market 
can accommodate, but the physical size of the facility or marketplace that matters. For example the 
number of airlines able at a given time to operate at an airport is determined by the airport’s 
physical size, as well as its ability to provide efficient and adequate support for the airlines at the 
airport. Another example is the numbers of competing products that a store has shelve space for, the 
physical size of the store determines the shelve space and the number of competing products; the 
number of competing parking lots a city has room for, is restrained by the city’s physical 
boundaries; the number of stores in a shopping mall by the size of the shopping mall; a shipping 
port’s ability to accommodate all ship sizes or types; etc.  
When a market’s capacity to accommodate firms is linked to its physical size, the market is 
comparable to a town’s marketplace. A marketplace has only room for a limited number of vendors 
of a particular type and size, and there is a trade-off between the number of vendor types and the 
size of vendors. Further, the number of products a vendor is able to supply is linked to the size of 
the stall the vendor is able to have. Thus, the total number of vendors and the number of products is 
linked to the physical size of the marketplace, as well as the level of competition and the vendors’ 
relative competitive strength.  
Whether or not market structure is determined by demand or physical restraints, new entrants 
usually increase competition, leading to lower prices forcing incumbents to cut prices, reducing 
profits and forcing incumbents to become more efficient and innovative. As such entry of firms has 
important effects on incumbent firms’ pricing and on consumer welfare. As a result incumbents 
have strong incentives to deter entry. Incumbent firms may employ different strategies to deter 
entry and quite a number of theoretical models have been made to explain the strategies of 
incumbents, and under which conditions they employ them. Alongside with the theoretical 
contributions, a large number of empirical studies have been made to test the theoretical models, but 
the empirical studies make various predictions on incumbent pricing behaviour and are much less 
conclusive than the theoretical research (Smiley, 1988, Geroski, 1995, Simon, 2005). 
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Generally, empirical studies on incumbent’s responses to entry, find that entry can reduce, has no 
effect, or even increases incumbent’s prices, even within the same industry (Frank and Salkever, 
1997; Yamawacki, 2002).  
The mixed results is not only a challenge for theoretical and empirical research, it also provide no 
guidance for policy makers, turning to more or less alternative policies to increase entry or to 
increase the level of competition among the existing firms, for example freed or new space at 
congested airports in Europe is allocated primarily to new entrant airlines.  
I propose a new explanation to the mixed empirical findings. I propose that incumbent pricing 
behaviour should be seen from the point of view of locational space as a physical restraint on entry. 
In this setting, incumbent pricing behaviour should be understood by considering firm specific 
variables, as well as incumbent incentives of competing locally, relative to that of potential entry. 
A literature review of some of the many theoretical and empirical contributions on pricing 
behaviour of incumbents, when faced with entry are presented in section 2.0. In section 3.0 a game 
theoretic model is developed and then used to analyse optimal pricing strategies under asymmetric 
information, in a game with incomplete information and observable actions. The solution concept of 
the game is a behavioural rule, stating how to play the game. The findings implies a competitive 
behaviour of incumbents of disposing weaker opponents only if, it leads to weaker competitors 
entering the market. Further, to avoid stronger opponents, weaker opponents are used by the 
incumbent to shelter the market. Thus, the results can explain the somewhat mixed empirical 
findings, by claiming that they are a result of differences in incumbent incentives to compete at the 
facilities. The findings of the model are then compared to how the European Union’s (EU) 
competition authority investigate predatory pricing to determine whether the suggested pricing 
behaviour is anti-competitive and if the behaviour can be detected given the present tools of 
investigation; in section 4.0. Finally in section 5.0 policy suggestions is made. 
 
2.0 Literature review 
A great deal of research has been made on entry and incumbent behaviour and in general, the 
theoretical contributions can be divided into two kinds of models: limit pricing and predation. Limit 
pricing models, emphasize that entry can be deterred pre-entry and predation models, that 
deterrence can also happen post-entry. 
Limit pricing models, such as Bain (1956), Modigliani (1958) and Sylos-Labini (1962), explain 
how an incumbent firm by setting its pre-entry price low enough can make entry look unprofitable 
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or even impossible. As incumbents in this way foregoes pre-entry profit by deterring entry by 
pricing below marginal cost, the strategy is only credible, if the incumbents has deep-pockets or can 
reasonably expect to have deterred entry in the long run (Geroski, 1995). A different case of “deep-
pockets” is that of incumbents with multi-market contact that is a firm producing in two or more 
markets, where it at least in a subset or subsets of markets is dominant. The dominance can then be 
used to support predatory or entry-deterring strategies in one or more of the other markets and in 
this way is credible for new entry (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). But as far as limit pricing 
strategies is considered, Simon (2005) notes that there is little empirical evidence to support limit 
pricing strategies. 
Game-theoretic models show that rational potential entrants does not have to take low pre-entry 
seriously, as they are not a good prediction of post-entry profitability and thus incumbents would 
just spend too much effort on deterrence through prices, with little effect on entry (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982). 
A number of other strategies and conditions may also be entry deterring, such as incumbents 
investing in excess capacity (Spence, 1977, Dixit, 1980). Empirical studies like Smiley (1988) do 
not find support for investment in excess capacity as deterring entry. 
Empirical research is much less conclusive than theoretical research when it comes to entry and 
incumbent pricing (Geroski, 1995), in fact empirical studies seem to point in all directions with 
regard to the pricing behaviour of incumbents, both in relation to potential, as well as real entry and 
with regard to pre- as well as post-entry pricing behaviour. 
In addition to the theories of entry deterrence, Baumol et al’s (1988) theory of contestable markets 
emphasize that both actual, as well as potential entry will affect the pricing behaviour of incumbent 
firms. The theory has been examined in relation to air transport, but has not found much support for 
the point of view, that air transport markets should be contestable. 
Turning to the studies of specific markets, then the existing body of empirical studies on incumbent 
airline’s pricing behaviour when entry, generally find mixed results with regard to the effect on 
incumbents’ pricing. Some studies find that incumbents cut prices post entry (Joskow, et al, 1994 
and Windle and Desner, 1995), while others find that incumbents accommodate entry by leaving 
prices unchanged or even raise prices (Borenstein, 1989 and 1990). 
In the light of Klemperer (1987) and Perloff and Salop (1985) the mixed empirical results can be 
understood by seeing markets, as characterised by heterogeneous goods targeted different market 
segments, such as business and non-business customers or as a brand-loyal and a price-sensitive 
 5 
segment. Entry in such markets can have two effects on the incumbents’ pricing strategy: a 
competitive effect and a displacement effect.  
The competitive effect is when, as a response to entry, the incumbent decrease prices in order to 
keep customers. The displacement effect occur as a result of the loss of price sensitive customers to 
an entrant focussed on price competition, leaving an incumbent, focussed on providing brand 
quality, to concentrate even more on the brand-loyal segment, as the segment will continue to 
purchase from the incumbent, even if the price of the entrant is lower, see Rosenthal (1980) and 
Hollander (1987). If the competitive and displacement effects can occur simultaneously, the net 
effect on prices depends on which effect is more prominent. Which is to ask to what extent is the 
incumbent able to build a profitable business on the brand-loyal segment alone? Since brand loyalty 
for a large part is created by for example marketing efforts, the profitability depends on the airline’s 
ability to keep customers loyal. 
In Klemperer (1987), Cairns and Galbraith (1990) and Larsen and Storm (2001) the issue to what 
extent frequent flyer programmes (FFP), or for that matter any other artificially created brand 
loyalty, is able to lock in markets is examined. It is found that it crucially depend on the customer’s 
subjective valuation of the benefits of being loyal, in relation to the firm’s cost of providing the 
customer the benefits. As long as the customer’s valuation is higher than the cost of providing the 
benefits, programme owners will be able to price above the price of a low cost airline without a 
FFP. All airlines engaged in loyalty inducing business strategies tend to offset the competitive 
effects, as minor changes in a firm’s business strategy are enough to mitigate any economies of 
scope effects, such as brand loyalty. This is in line with the view of competition in monopolistic 
markets with heterogeneous goods. In the short run it is possible to earn rents, but impossible in the 
long run, as the prospect of rents attract new firms targeting their products for previously untargeted 
or existing segments. Thus, although different market segments can be identified, the effect of non-
price competition on observed price changes may not be significant. 
Simon (2005), using an empirical model of magazine markets, finds that incumbents vary in their 
incentives to cut prices; in that incumbents with greater incentives are more likely to respond 
aggressively to entry. It is then concluded, that incumbents’ pricing strategies in general depend on 
their incentives to compete.  
This paper is in line with the study by Simon, but in addition it is proposed that the mixed results 
should be understood, as the incumbent taking the physical restraint on the number of firms in a 
market or a facility into account, when making its pricing decisions.  
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3.0 A Game Theoretic Approach to Pricing Behaviour at Capacity Constrained Facilities 
Imagine two markets: a market with constrained or limited access, called the local market, and a 
surrounding market, called a global market. The global market consists of firms ready to enter the 
local market, as soon as space becomes available and that there is no significant sunk costs, entry or 
exit barriers. Space becomes available only if an existing firm exits the local market. The global 
market could be perceived, as having many subsets of local markets or simply as a pool of potential 
entrants to the local market. 
Assume that incumbent firms are not able to capture the entire market for different reasons. It could 
be that the freed space at the local market is reserved or is easier to access for new entrants at the 
local market. This would for example be the case, if the incumbent airline is dominant at an airport 
and is thus subject to competition authority scrutiny and objections, if it attempts to occupy the 
freed space and thus increase its dominance locally. It could also be problems relating to 
coordination problems between existing and new capacity. 
Firms in the two markets produce similar products, but markets are assumed to be separate, as the 
product cannot be imported or exported to the local or the global market when produced in either 
place. An example of such a product would be airline point to point routes, such as Berlin – Paris 
and Hamburg – Paris, although both are air travel to the same end-destination and in that sense 
homogenous, the trips cannot be produced in one place, exported and consumed at another. 
Alternatively it could be, that consumer transaction costs effectively separate markets. In both 
circumstances only local market consumers will benefit from the production of the service at the 
local or global market. 
Although it is not a necessary condition, it is assumed that the number of local market firms is two 
and that the number of global market firms is limited, but sufficiently high to ensure a wide variety 
of firm cost types, that would enter the local market. 
Demand conditions at the local market are characterised by n consumers, where n R∈ . For ease of 
assessment, consumers are assumed to buy one unit at the offered price, and from the airline 
offering the lowest price. In the case where firms offer the same price, there is an equal probability 
of consumers choosing to consume at any of the local market firms. 
The global firm bound to enter the local market, is picked randomly and independently (by nature) 
from the pool of global market firms, to illustrate that the decision to enter a market is private 
information to the firm. This implies that local market firms do not know exactly, what firm type 
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will enter the local market. What they do know is the probability distribution of potential entrants, 
or in other words, the composition of cost types of the global market pool of firms. As a 
consequence of this, payoffs to local market firms will depend on the random move and the actions 
of entrant firms, as well as the actions of other local market firms. The available information to the 
firms is assumed to be market dependent, in the sense that local market firms have information 
about local market specific information and information about global market firms, whereas global 
market firms have global market specific information only. This could be interpreted as local firms 
having a first mover advantage, such as superior knowledge about the local market demand 
conditions.  
Local market firms have full information about local firm costs, but do not have information about 
the global market firm’s cost other than the distribution of cost types. This is to reflect that existing 
firms do not know if entry is new firms or existing firms entering the market. It also means that 
local firms assign no other probability on entrants, other than that given by the distribution of cost 
types. The true cost type of a global firm is revealed to the local market firm, when the global firm 
enters the local market and the local market firm’s cost is revealed to the global firm, when it enters 
the local market. Thus, entry implies complete information about local market firm costs, prior to 
firms simultaneously choosing prices. This also implies that there is asymmetric information 
between local and global market firms. The game is also characterised by incomplete information, 
since firms do not have complete information about the realization of the entrant firm’s costs.  
Used either as subscripts or stand-alone letters: i and j refer to firms of the initial game, e to entrant 
firms, g to global market firms, L to the local market, and G to the global market. Subscript g and l 
refer to global or local market specific occurrences and t to game period. The number of firms (N) 
is defined, as ,L GN N N R⊂ ∈ and L GN N N× = , where { },L tN i j= , if prices are i jp p= at 0t =  , or
{ } 0,L tN i j == and { },L tN i e= , whenever firms undercut, that is at any period after information about 
the firms is revealed to the local market firms, that is at 0t > .  
In any sub-game the number of firms is assumed to be the maximum numbers of firms in the local 
market, which are assumed to be limited to two. The set of available actions are denoted a, and 
defined as a A∈ , where ,L GA A A⊂ and L GA A∉ . Further, 










<
=
>
= ejiL ppA , and
{ },GA entry no entry= , where Ga A∈  is chosen by nature.  
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Payoffs in the model are denoted π and firms are assumed to maximize profit. To make the global 
market a homogeneous or generic market, it is assumed that global market firms earn zero profit in 
every period they stay in the global market.  
The costs of the local market firms, entrant firms and global market firms are defined respectively 
as , , ,i j e gc c c c C∈  , where [ , ]g gC c c= . That is, the marginal cost of the firms in the local market is 
at least as high, as the lowest marginal cost among the global market firms. It is assumed that i jc c<
, to illustrate that only real cost advantages can force firms to exit markets, and that i ec c
>
=
<
. The 
distribution function of C is F(C) and assuming that C is continuous over the interval [ , ]g gC c c= , 
the probability function ( )eP c can be written, as ( ) ( ) ( )
e
x
e e
c
F x P c x P c x dx= ≤ = ≤∫ , where ( )eP c is the 
derivative of the distribution function.  
In this setting, price competition in one period will also affect proceeding periods, in that if a high 
cost local market firm is forced to exit, it may be replaced by a more competitive opponent. This 
entrant firm may in turn decide to force the incumbent firm to exit, that is if e ic c≤ . This imply that 
space is not only a scarce asset to firms, but also a factor to take account of, when determining their 
optimal price. 
 
Proposition: Whenever space becomes available entry occurs. 
 
Proof: If space becomes available, it must imply that one of the local market firms has forced the 
other to exit. Given its information, a global market firm will assess, whether it is better to stay or 
leave the global market. The payoff to global market firms of non-entry is assumed to be
( ) 0 0g t tπ = ∀ ≥ , that is to be zero as long as they stay in the global market. The payoff to global 
market firms of entry depend on the action chosen by the remaining local market firm, to that of the 
entrant firm, that is whether the price is i ep p
>
=
<
. The best response of the incumbent and the entrant 
firm, depends on how the entrant firm’s costs compares to the local market firm’s that is whether
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e ic c
>
=
<
. Under these assumptions we can write the global market firms’ profit as, 
0
( 0) ( ) ,
t n
G g t e t e
t
E E c Cπ π
′
′
Π = = + ∀ ∈∑ ∑ and ic C∀ ∈ for all actions 0i e Gp p E
>
= ⇒ Π ≥
<
. The 
number of periods without entry is t′and ( ) 1n t′− ≥ is the number of periods with successful entry.  
As c C∈  where ,g gC c c =   , the global firm can expect that its costs is less than the incumbent firm 
with probability ( ) 0eP c ≥ , and greater than the incumbent’s cost with a probability of ( )1 ( )eP c− . 
The expected payoff of a global firm from entry can then be written as, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0e e e i e e i e e iE P c c c P c c c P c c cπ π π π= < + − ≥ = < ≥ implying that e GEπ π≥ . Thus,  
entry of a global market firm will occur, whenever space become available, as the incentives of 
doing so are greater than staying at the global market. 
Denote the set of possible outcomes of entryΩ , and allow ec C∈Ω⇒Ω⊂ . Assume that entrant 
firms are drawn independently fromΩ and that the probability of entry of a firm with costs ec is
( )ecρ . Further, assume that local market firms have the same conjecture about ( )ecρ . 
The initial information of the local market firms about global market firms areΩ , the composition 
of the global pool is [ , ]g gC c c=  where , , ,i j e gc c c c C∈ and the probability distribution of the 
possible outcomes of the random move is ( )ρ ∈∆ Ω . 
Impose the following rules of the game: that entry occurs in the period just after exit has occurred in 
the local market, but prior to the proceeding sub-game; that at the moment of entry, entrant cost is 
revealed to the local market firm and the local market firm cost is revealed to the entrant; that every 
sub-game is characterised by Bertrand competition with simultaneous price setting; that firms prefer 
to earn zero profits and produce, than not producing at all; that firms are assumed to be risk neutral; 
and that exit of a firm occurs whenever its individual period profit is negative, that is if
( ),, 0i j e t tπ π < ∀ . 
To play the game, all firms plan in advance what kind of strategy they will use for every piece of 
information revealed and for every possible action. For local firms in particular, they will use the 
revealed information by the random move to update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule about the 
composition of global market firms and the possible entrant firm’s costs. Under these assumptions 
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payoffs will not only depend on the random move, but also on the actions chosen by the firms, that 
is : A Rπ Ω× → . This means that not only the history of actions, but also the outcome of the chance 
movement will determine the payoff of the sub-game and the expected pay-off of the entire history 
of sub-games of the game.  
The game described so far constitutes a game with asymmetric information and incomplete 
information with observable actions, see Harsanyi (1967-68) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). 
The equilibrium of the game is a Bayesian equilibrium (BE) and constitute a behavioural rule 
specifying how the firm will play the game for all possible combinations of the revealed 
information, that is for all possible outcomes of the random move. The Bayesian equilibrium of the 
game is then a vector 1 2( , ,..., )nβ β β β=  s.t. i∀ , iθ∀ and is∀ , for which ( ( ), ) ( , )i i i i i i is
β βπ β θ θ π θ≥ , 
where iθ is beliefs of firm i, s is the strategy and β the behavioural rule ( )i sβ θ ∈ . The BE of the 
game is: for all firms, whatever they know, there are no profitable deviations from the behavioural 
rule that is to the way to play the game. To find a proper candidate for the solution to the game, 
consider the standard Bertrand competition game of one period, and the assumption about the local 
and global market firms’ cost. In games of Bertrand competition with two players, i and j, the 
dominant strategies are respectively i jp p≤ and j ip p≤ for i jc c= . If on the other hand i jc c< , the 
dominant strategy for the respective firms is i jp p< , which imply exit of the inefficient firm. If we 
introduce the possibility of entry, the firms have to take account of entrant firms’ costs as well, 
when determining optimal strategies. 
This suggests that the composition of the global pool of cost types is important, as it will affect the 
formation of strategies of the local market firms. To simplify the analysis, assume that the pool of 
global market firms is reduced by the number of firms entering the local market, and that exiting 
local market firms do not re-enter the global pool. When this is the case, then if a local firm decide 
to undercut its competitor, entry will occur and the global pool will become smaller. One 
consequence of this is that, if undercutting is not attractive, the game reduces to the infinitely 
repeated Bertrand game.  
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We can ignore firm j and focus on the strategic choices of firm i, since if j ic c> then
( )j i j jBR p p c= = ip∀ . Consider the case where the beliefs for the period just after the initial period 
of the game, is that the entrant’s costs are higher than the cost of the present competitor to firm i in 
the local market, that is ( ) ( )1 , 1 , ,ˆ (( ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ) ( )i i e t j e t i e t j e t i e j e tt tc c c c Ec cθ θ θ θ+ + ′= > > ≤ = ⇒ > . In this 
case the best response of firm i is to undercut, or ,( )i i j e tBR p c= < , since
, ,( ( ) ) ( ( ) )i i j e t i i j e tE p c p cπ π< > = . The result is then, that the inefficient firm at the local market 
exit and is replaced by a firm from the global market.  
Now consider what happens if the realised entrant cost is 1 ,( ) ( )i e e t j e tc c c c+< = < , then
,( ) ( ( ) )i i e i i j e tp c p cπ π= < = and 1( ) ( ( ) )i i e i i e tp c p Ecπ π += > = . Thus, local market firms will update 
their beliefs about global firms, since 1( )e e tc Ec +< or that iˆ iθ θ ′> is not what was expected. Thus, 
drawing a firm from the global market pool, with lower than expected costs from the global pool, 
imply an increase in the probability, that the next entrant will have high costs. 
In the proceeding period firm i will still have the choice of undercutting to find a better price or 
refrain to do so and stay at the lower price. If firm i continue the search for a high cost opponent, 
firm i would expect a higher payoff in the proceeding period to make up for any incurred period 
loss or series of losses. If the firm should for some reason choose not to undercut, then it would 
incur a unit loss in every proceeding period, consisting of the difference in costs of the weak 
opponents and a single shot benefit from undercutting in total of ,, , 1
2( )
( ) ( ) 0j e tL j e t j e t
c
c c
n t+
∆ = − + >
−
. 
Thus, the firm would expect entrant costs of at least ,( )j e t Lc + ∆ before choosing to undercut again. 
This means that a local market firm will only undercut, if it provide increasing incentives. 
On the other hand, if 1 1( ) ( )e t e tEc c+ +< that is if 2 1( ) ( )e t e tc Ec+ +> , firms’ will update their beliefs such 
that 1 2( ) ( )i e t i e tc cθ θ+ +> . Thus, drawing a higher than expected cost type from the global pool, 
implies reducing expectations about entrant’s cost in proceeding periods. As the global pool is 
finite, undercutting cannot be a continuous activity of the local firm, as undercutting will stop when
, ,( ) ( )
n n
i i j e t i i j e t
t t
p p E p pπ π
′ ′
= ≥ <∑ ∑ or if e ic c< . Thus, the investigation of the formation of beliefs 
and best responses so far suggest the following solution to the game.  
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Proposition: Given the assumptions and conditions of the game, then for the game to have a BE, 
then at each sub-game the firms: 
a) Update beliefs using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. 
b) Choose not to undercut, that is to play , ,i j e j ep p c= = whenever
∑∑
′′
<≥=
n
t
teji
n
t
teji ppEpp )()( ,, ππ . This is so when , 1( ) ( )i j e t e tc c Ec′ ′+= ≥ . 
c) In every sub-game choose to undercut, that is to play , ,i j e j ep p c< = whenever
, ,( ) ( )
n n
i j e t i j e t
t t
p p E p pπ π
′ ′
= < <∑ ∑ .This is so when , 1( ) ( )i j e t e tc c Ec′ ′+< < , i jc c< and i ec c< . 
Where t′ indicate the sub-game proceeding entry and revelation of firm specific cost to local market 
firms or in the case of the initial sub-game, the revelation of the cost of firm i and j to both the 
firms. The consequence of the rule for firm j is that, following the assumption about costs, that is
i jc c< , risk neutrality and the condition for game participation that 0π ≥  or otherwise exit, the best 
response of firm j is ( )j j j ep c cθ= ∀ . This will also apply for entrants that have entered the local 
market for which e ic c≥ , but if e ic c< , entrants become the “new” incumbents, and follow the 
behavioural rule specified above. 
 
Proof: Ad. a) If the firm does not update its information, its beliefs about entrant firms’ costs will 
be wrong. The consequence will be that the firm is no longer having consistent beliefs and that the 
probability of being right about entrant firm’s costs is independent on the revealed information. 
Thus, using Bayes’ rule to update beliefs ensures that expected beliefs are consistent with the 
revealed information, and that the firm is able to correctly assess the game. 
Ad. b) Assume that, , 1( ) ( ) ( )i t j e t e tp c Ec′ ′ ′+= < , 1( )i e tc Ec ′+< and firm i do not choose to undercut, in 
that case the profit of the firm i is , , ,
1
( ) ( ) ( )
n n
i i j e j e t i i j e i i e t
t t
p p c p c E p Ecπ π π
′ ′+
= = < < + =∑ ∑ . Thus, 
firm i would be able to increase its payoff by undercutting, as long as ,j e ec Ec< at time t′ . 
Ad. c) The proof follows from ad. b). 
 
The intuition behind the BE should be straight forward. Based on firms’ beliefs about just how 
efficient global market firms might be, firms evaluate their strategic position relative to each other 
and in comparison to what they might get from undercutting and not undercutting. Thus, from the 
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perspective of the firm, whenever entrant’s expected costs are lower than or equal to the present 
competitor’s cost, the firm’s present competitive position provide greater benefits in the long run, 
than you can achieve by competing with your present competitor in the local market and from 
global market entry. Thus, the pricing behaviour implies price stickiness and upward pricing, as 
well as competition only taking place, if the right incentives are there. 
Notice that an increase in local market firms with many different cost types would not change the 
BE, as the dominant strategy of the most efficient local market firm would be to set prices equal to 
the lowest possible cost type, that is minp c≤ . Thus, adding more local firms to the game would not 
change the fundamental strategies of the game and thus, the way to play the game.  
The next section examines the possible consequence of the behavioural rule for EU competition 
policy. 
 
4.0 The Behavioural Rule and EU Competition Policy and Regulatory Approaches 
In those circumstances where the most efficient incumbent is also dominant, the pricing behaviour 
of the incumbent is subject to competition authority (CA) scrutiny. The question is, if CAs would 
classify such behaviour as anti-competitive, or is able to detect it by using the tools CAs normally 
apply in competition law cases, from the point of view of a European competition authority. These 
issues will in turn be examined in this section. 
The EU competition rules of article 102 in the EU Treaty of Lisbon protect small firms from 
abusive market behaviour of dominant firms. Dominance is a market share greater than 40 pct. or 
below 40 pct., if market shares of competitors are comparatively lower. Abusive market behaviour 
can be many things. Among those that are most similar to the pricing behaviour found in the 
previous section is predatory pricing. Predatory pricing is defined “..as the practice where a 
dominant company lowers its price and thereby deliberately incurs losses or foregoes profits in the 
short run so as to enable it to eliminate or discipline one or more rivals or to prevent entry by one 
or more potential rivals thereby hindering the maintenance of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition, Commission (2005).” The pricing behaviour found in the 
previous section fulfils this definition, as it presumes that an efficient incumbent will only compete 
with a less efficient firm, if it provides a higher profit than otherwise. This imply that the pricing 
behaviour in effect prevent entry and the growth of competition.  
In assessing whether or not a dominant firm has used predatory pricing, competition authorities 
(CA) will assess whether the dominant firm has priced below its own costs, by using the so called 
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form-based approach, see Commission (2005). The form-based approach implies, that cost 
benchmarks are calculated, such as the “average avoidable cost (AAC),” which is the average cost 
that the firm could have avoided by not producing the extra amount, as a consequence of the alleged 
abusive behaviour, and the “long run average incremental cost (LRAIC),” which is the average of 
the variable and fixed cost of the firm by producing the particular product. If the firm produces only 
one product, LRAIC is the average total cost (ATC), while LRAIC is below the ATC for firms 
producing more than one product. When using a form-based approach, CAs do not take effects of 
the anti-competitive behaviour into consideration, but assume that the observed behaviour have had 
market and anti-competitive effects, (AKZO, 1991; Commission, 2005). Effects of the anti-
competitive behaviour could be, would be to assess if the behaviour have had any damaging effects 
on competition. 
Pricing below AAC is interpreted by CAs as an indication that a firm, at least as efficient as the 
firm with the alleged abusive behaviour, would not be able to compete with this firm without 
incurring a loss. Pricing below LRAIC indicates that an at least as efficient firm is shielded from the 
market.  
The pricing behaviour of the previous section would fall short of any CA analysis, since the 
behavioural rule imply, that incumbents would price ip AAC LRAIC> > , but the anticompetitive 
behaviour lies not in the most efficient firm undercutting the least efficient firm in the local market, 
but in the effect of undercutting on market efficiency that is on social welfare. In other words, the 
incumbent have allowed a less efficient competitor to enter the local market by eliminating a more 
efficient competitor.  
For competition authorities to be able to discover that the pricing behaviour is predatory, CAs 
would have to assess the effects on pricing of the incumbent dominant firm and make an assessment 
of the efficiency of potential entry, to that of the incumbent or the existing firm. In addition, CAs 
would also have to assess, whether or not entry is likely to occur. This suggests, that CA’s should 
determine whether the behaviour does have an effect, and thus use an effect-based approach, rather 
than a form-based approach to verify competitive harm in all cases, where market access is 
constrained. 
 
5.0. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
As shown incumbent pricing behaviour can be seen from the point of view of locational space being 
a physical restraint on entry, in this setting, pricing behaviour should be understood by considering 
 15 
firm specific variables, as well as incumbent incentives of competing locally relative to that of 
potential entry. 
The resulting pricing behaviour suggest, that market power could be exercised much more subtle, 
than through direct aggressive competitive practices and beyond what the use of any bright-line test 
by competition authorities can detect, such as assessing whether P<AAC or P<LRAIC. As the 
pricing behaviour found in this article depends on the assumptions of restrained access to a facility, 
initiatives designed to increase capacity will have real welfare improving consequences. Other 
relevant initiatives should be aimed at increasing social welfare, by finding ways to limit the 
possibility of exercising the behaviour. This could for example be done by using auctions and 
public tenders, as a screening mechanism for allocating competition to capacity constrained 
facilities. 
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